Frontline (FRO) Q3 2026 Earnings Call Transcript

Source Motley_fool
Logo of jester cap with thought bubble.

Image source: The Motley Fool.

DATE

Friday, Nov. 20, 2026

CALL PARTICIPANTS

  • Chief Executive Officer - Lars Barstad
  • Inger Klemp

TAKEAWAYS

  • Net Profit -- $641.4 million, representing earnings of $2.88 per share for the third quarter.
  • Adjusted Profit -- $530.9 million, excluding a synthetic option revaluation loss of $1.2 million.
  • VLCC Spot TCE -- $148,500 per day in the third quarter, driven by high demand for long-haul crude transport.
  • Q4 VLCC Bookings -- 68% of available days booked at $562,600 per day, reflecting record-level market volatility and geopolitical risk premiums.
  • Suezmax Spot TCE -- $102,500 per day in the third quarter, supported by increased shuttle traffic and sailing inefficiencies.
  • Q4 Suezmax Bookings -- 69% of days booked at $324,300 per day, representing significant sequential rate appreciation.
  • LR2/Aframax Spot TCE -- $67,800 per day in the third quarter, reflecting firm refined product trade despite Middle East disturbances.
  • Q4 LR2/Aframax Bookings -- 68% of days booked at $190,800 per day, showing growth in product tanker earnings.
  • Cash and Equivalents -- $1.4 billion, including undrawn revolving credit facility capacity of $1.1 billion.
  • Interest Rate Margin -- 118 basis points, representing a 60 basis point reduction since the first quarter of 2026.
  • Revolving Credit Facility Capacity -- $2.27 billion, with $1.2 billion currently drawn to manage liquidity actively.
  • Fleet Composition -- 51 vessels, comprising 14 VLCCs, 19 Suezmax tankers, and 18 Aframax/LR2 tankers following the sale of older tonnage.
  • Average Fleet Age -- 6.9 years, consisting of 100% eco-vessels with 69% being scrubber-fitted.
  • Cash Breakeven -- $23,600 per day on average for the fleet, which includes dry dock costs for 23 vessels.
  • Newbuilding Commitments -- $288.7 million, related to the acquisition of nine newbuildings with secured financing of up to $737 million.
  • Cash Generation Potential -- $4.4 billion, or $19.70 per share, based on spot market rates reported on Nov. 19.
  • Global Crude Exports -- Surpassed September 2025 heights, fueled by recovery in Middle East output and Atlantic Basin volumes.
  • Shuttle Fleet Utilization -- 70 VLCCs, representing nearly 20% of the actively traded independent fleet, currently engaged in Hormuz Strait shuttle operations.
  • Shipyard Lead Times -- 3.5 years, acting as a constraint on new vessel supply despite a growing order book.
  • Inventory Build Forecast -- 4 million barrels per day expected in 2027 by the EIA, supporting future tanker demand.

Need a quote from a Motley Fool analyst? Email pr@fool.com

RISKS

  • Barstad stated, "It's a fact that freight to some extent, stopped the yards," noting that extreme freight rates in October challenged the oil trading complex and temporarily halted some oil movements.
  • Barstad mentioned that between 1% and 2% of the global VLCC fleet is currently "either under repairs or in some cases, becoming a total loss" due to increasing attacks and security incidents in the shuttle trade.
  • Barstad noted that some shipyards are "struggling to get hold of" skilled workforce, creating labor inflation and limiting the capacity for aggressive shipbuilding growth.

SUMMARY

Frontline (NYSE:FRO) reported record financial performance driven by unprecedented freight rates and significant geopolitical disruptions that have altered global oil trading patterns. Management indicated that Middle Eastern national oil companies have increasingly taken control of their own logistics to manage freight costs, leading to highly inefficient shuttle trades and ship-to-ship transfers in the Gulf of Oman. The company maintains a modern fleet of 51 vessels with a low average age of 6.9 years, positioning it to capture elevated spot rates while maintaining a fleet-wide cash breakeven of $23,600 per day. Management expects record-breaking earnings for the fourth quarter based on high booking levels across all vessel classes, supported by shifting trade routes and the ongoing energy security narrative.

  • National oil companies in the Middle East have transitioned to using their own tonnage for exports, which CEO Barstad noted has "reduced the freight costs" and the rebates they previously offered to the market.
  • Sailing inefficiencies have increased as certain buyers prefer crude to move northbound through the Suez Canal and around Africa, a route Barstad described as "highly inefficient" as it requires ships to load at 3/4 capacity.
  • Management reported that Asian imports, excluding China, remain "extremely firm" and well beyond seasonal patterns, while Chinese imports still lag approximately 2 million barrels behind 2025 averages.
  • The company is shifting toward higher time charter coverage, with Barstad indicating that investors "should expect Frontline to have a much higher degree of time charter coverage" moving forward to lock in cash flow at elevated levels.
  • Frontline identified a "deadbeat fleet" of older, sanctioned, or dark vessels that is expected to move to recycling yards if market rates decline, providing a supply cushion as the order book delivers in 2028.
  • Shipyard constraints are intensifying as yards struggle to find skilled welders and workers, which Barstad stated is "creating some sort of inflation" in labor remuneration.

INDUSTRY GLOSSARY

  • Backwardated: A market condition where the current spot price is higher than prices for future delivery.
  • Eco-vessels: Ships designed with modern hull forms and engines to improve fuel efficiency and reduce emissions.
  • LR2: Long Range 2 tankers, which typically carry between 80,000 and 160,000 deadweight tons of refined products.
  • OFAC: The Office of Foreign Assets Control, a U.S. government agency that enforces economic and trade sanctions.
  • RCF: Revolving Credit Facility, a flexible line of credit that a company can draw from or repay as needed.
  • Scrubber: An exhaust gas cleaning system that removes sulfur oxides from a ship's engine emissions.
  • STS: Ship-to-ship transfer, the process of transferring cargo between two seagoing vessels.
  • Suezmax: A tanker of intermediate size capable of transiting the Suez Canal when fully loaded.
  • TCE: Time Charter Equivalent, a shipping industry performance measure used to calculate the average daily revenue performance of a vessel.
  • VLCC: Very Large Crude Carrier, a tanker capable of carrying approximately 2 million barrels of oil.

Full Conference Call Transcript

Operator: Good day, and thank you for standing by. Welcome to the Q3 2026 Frontline plc Earnings Conference Call. [Operator Instructions] Please be advised that today's conference is being recorded. I would now like to hand the conference over to your speaker today, Mr. Lars Barstad, CEO. Please go ahead.

Lars Barstad: Hello. Thank you. Dear all, thank you for dialing in to Frontline's quarterly earnings call. We continue to operate in an uncharted territory as there is no playbook for the events this market has seen over the last 9 months. I think it's important to note that behind the cash generation seen in the tanker industry in general, there also is operational strain and a growing concern for the safety of our seafarers and the environment. And Frontline is steaming ahead and the recent correction in rates only moves us from interstellar earnings to astronomical, we are running at a profit margin of about 90% with revenues 10x our running costs.

Before I give the word to Inger, I'll run through our TCE numbers on Slide 3 in the deck. For Frontline's third quarter of 2026, we made $148,500 per day on our spot trading VLCCs, $102,500 per day on our spot trading Suezmaxes and $67,800 per day on our LR2/Aframaxs. So far in the fourth quarter of 2026, 68% of our VLCC days are booked at $562,600 per day, 69% of our Suezmax days are booked at $324,300 per day and 68% of our LR2/Aframax days at $190,800 per day. Unprecedented numbers and all up in the 6 digits.

I need to remind the audience that these numbers are still on a load-to-discharge basis with the implications of balance days at the end of the quarter that may occur. We face -- that even with all this, we face a record-breaking fourth quarter. Now I'll let Inger take you through the financial highlights.

Inger Klemp: Thanks, Lars, and good morning and good afternoon, ladies gentlemen. Let's then turn to Slide 4 and look at the profit statement highlights. We report a profit of $641.4 million or $2.88 per share and adjusted profit of $530.9 million or $2.38 per share in this quarter. The adjusted profit in the third quarter decreased by $49.3 million compared with the previous quarter, primarily due to a decrease in our TCE earnings.

The ship operating expenses decreased by $2.1 million from previous quarter, and that was mainly due to sale of 2 Suezmax tankers in the second quarter and 2 VLCCs in the third quarter, but also to a decrease in general running costs for the remaining fleet, which was then partially offset by a decrease in supplier rebates. The administrative expenses decreased by $1.6 million from the previous quarter, and this excludes synthetic option revaluation loss of $1.2 million in the third quarter and the gain of $5.3 million in the second quarter. The adjusted interest expense decreased by $1 million from previous quarter, primarily due to lower interest rate margins.

Depreciation increased by $4.4 million from the previous quarter, and that was due to the delivery of 6 newbuildings in the second and third quarter, partially offset by sale of vessels. Let's then look at the balance sheet on Slide 5. Frontline has a solid balance sheet and a strong liquidity of $1.4 billion in cash and cash equivalents. And that is including undrawn amounts of revolver capacity of $1.1 billion in marketable securities and minimum cash requirements at the end of September. We have no debt maturities until 2028, and we have no meaningful maturities until 2031. And this is supported by increased tenure across the portfolio, as shown in the maturity chart on the slide.

The remaining newbuilding commitments at the end of September was $288.7 million, and that relates to the acquisition of the 9 newbuildings from affiliates of Hemen earlier this year. The company has secured newbuilding financing of up to $737 million for all the 9 newbuildings as we have set out in the press release. Let's then turn to Slide 6. And let's look at the financing optimizations that we have been doing recently. From June to November 2026, we lowered the weighted average interest rate margin by 60 basis points from 178 basis points at the end of the first quarter of 2026 to 118 basis points at the date of this presentation.

That was made through margin reductions on existing facilities and also through the refinancing of selected facilities. The reduction was driven by amendments with 23 basis points, refinancings with 27 basis points and newbuilding financing and asset sales with 10 basis points. The total RCF capacity increased from $473 million at the end of the first quarter of 2026, and then up to $2.27 billion at the end of the third quarter of '26 of which then $1.2 billion was drawn and $1.1 billion was undrawn. This RCF structure allows the company flexibility to manage liquidity actively without holding excess cash on the balance sheet.

Let's then move to Slide 7 and look at the fleet composition and the cash breakeven and OpEx. Upon delivery of the remaining VLCC newbuildings and the sale of 2 VLCCs, our fleet consists of 14 VLCCs, 19 Suezmax tankers and 18 Aframax/LR2 tankers and has an average age of 6.9 years, consists of 100% eco-vessels where 69% are scrubber fitted. We estimate an average cash breakeven rate for the next 12 months of approximately $24,100 per day for VLCCs, $25,200 per day for Suezmax tankers and $20,600 per day for LR2 tankers, with a fleet average estimate of about $23,600 per day. This includes dry dock costs of 10 VLCCs, 6 Suezmax tankers and 7 LR2 tankers.

The fleet average estimate excluding dry dock cost is about $21,800 per day or $1,800 per day less. We recorded OpEx, including dry dock in the third quarter of $8,400 per day for VLCCs, $10,600 per day for Suezmax tankers and $13,400 per day for LR2 tankers. And this includes dry docks of 2 Suezmax tankers and 3 LR2 tankers in the third quarter. Q3 '26 fleet average OpEx, excludes dry dock of $8,100 per day. Let's then move to Slide 8. Cash generation, Frontline has a substantial cash generation potential with about 28,000 earnings days annually.

And as you can see from this slide, the cash generation potential basis current fleet to TCE rates and spot market rates as of November 19, is $4.4 billion or approximately $19.70 per share, providing a cash flow yield of 44% basis current share price. A 30% increase from current spot market will increase the cash generation potential to about $5.8 billion or $26.10 per share. And likewise, 30% decrease from current spot market will decrease the cash generation potential to $3 billion or $13.30 per share. With this, I leave the word to Lars again.

Lars Barstad: Thank you, Inger. Let's move to Slide 9 and look at the market highlights. Middle East continues to be the focal point and although we almost forget that during the summer months, we had an MOU in place between U.S. and Iran, and we actually started to see risk premiums leaving the market. This quickly changed as the summer came to an end. And during the third quarter, the risks of trading, both in the Black Sea, in the Red Sea and in and around the Gulf of Oman increased. The big kind of step change as far as we saw it, was that the Middle East-based national oil companies started to take control of their own logistics.

The market started to run out of shipowners that were willing to take the risk even despite the highly -- high-paid routes, they basically stopped accepting taking the risk of passing through the Strait of Hormuz. The only way for the Middle East exporters to arrange for freight of their oil. We have to remember, this is like a national security issue was to actually buy the tonnage themselves and move the oil. This way, they managed to reduce the rebates they had to offer to the market in order to get the oil exported. Secondly, it also reduced the freight costs, and they didn't have to pay third parties astronomical numbers in order to get the oil moving.

And this is the situation we basically have now is that the mother lode of the oil being moved through the Strait of Hormuz is actually on tonnage controlled by the exporters themselves. This created further growing shuttle traffic in the Gulf of Oman with lengthy ship-to-ship transfer activity, increasing the sailing inefficiencies as we proceeded, kind of, towards the end of Q3 and the start of Q4. Then further, we've had the Yanbu pipeline disturbance and also the risk situation, specifically in the Red Sea adding to these challenges. We observed that certain buyers of crude oil actually prefer the oil to go northbound, which is highly inefficient.

You load about 3/4 of a ship, take it through the Suez Canal, top-up at Sidi Kerir and then you sail all the way around African continent. All this has drawn a lot of ton miles out of the market and increased utilization to the point where freight rates ticked close to $1 million outside of the Strait of Hormuz. But despite all this or maybe because of all this, global crude oil exports actually moved beyond September '25 heights as the chart on the top right-hand side illustrates. As to note though that this is October numbers, November numbers is likely to be reduced.

During the same period, although the tanker order book continues to grow, the growth -- or the pace of the growth is slowing. And we now have 3.5 years lead time, if you go to the market to order virtually any ship at this point. We still believe that what's happening around us and what has transpired over the last 9 months are going to have long-term implications for the market. We're going to have inventory refill. We're going to have energy security scrutiny and also, we're going to see refiners diversify how they source their feedstock. If you look at the market charts on the bottom of this chart, yes, we have corrected quite substantially.

But one has to peek over to the left-hand side of this chart and look at what levels we're actually talking about. Bottoming out on VLCC is around $250,000 a day. Suezmax is around $175,000 a day. And also, you might notice that Aframax is out of the U.S. Gulf is straight back up to almost $200,000 per day. So by no means this is not a freight crisis. Let's move to Slide 10 and discuss a little bit more around the flows. So we already mentioned that global crude oil exports have surpassed the heights of September 2025. Part of this is, of course, caused by Middle East crude oil exports back to pre-conflict levels.

But it's also the addition or the incremental barrels coming out of the Atlantic Basin that adds to this. And also, it's important that despite the hits on Yanbu, flows have resumed and added a lot of output from the region as we can see on the top right-hand chart. What's also very interesting to observe, and this is the bottom chart is that the Asian imports, excluding China, is extremely firm and is well beyond seasonal patterns. And then we can only imagine what will happen when or if China resumes full import volumes. They're still lagging about 2 million barrels behind the average of Q4 2025. We've also seen some positive moves on the products trade.

This trade has been laggard largely due to protectionism amongst producers, but also the lack of kind of ample exports, particularly from China. But now we are starting to see from the Middle East at least, it's a huge refining region that the clean trade is starting to drizzle through despite the disturbance in the Strait of Hormuz. Again, this is data into October. I think everybody who has followed the recent events in the Strait of Hormuz, we should probably expect a little bit of reduction here. But this is a firmish long-term trend that of course, depending on activity, we think is going to continue.

I think one thing that's very important to remember, and I mentioned it on the previous slide, the EIA expects world inventory builds to the tune of 4 million barrels per day in 2027. This comes on top of their expected consumption of 104.5 million barrels per day. Since the inventory builds are happening primarily then in U.S. and also in Asia, particularly the Asian part of this is going to be crude transported. But again, the recent deterioration in the security situation in the Strait of Hormuz will have an impact short term, particularly on the U.S. exports trade.

But this is going to be a positive one because we're already seeing that with the current kind of very prompt lack of oil coming out of the Strait of Hormuz, we're already seeing arbs from the U.S. starting to work into Europe. And secondly, it would start to work to Asia. Let's move to Slide 11. And this is a slide we wanted to show basically to kind of show you how sensitive this market and particularly so the VLCC to small changes in, kind of, how the population of tankers are positioned.

If you assume we have around a bit north of 900 VLCCs in the market, and I think it's better to read it on the right-hand slide -- chart, sorry, the left and the right slide actually show more or less the same, but it's probably easier to see on the right side. So if you assume we have about -- a bit over 900 VLCCs globally, currently, 241 of them are either about 20 years of age, they are dark or sanctioned. We believe China controls a bit north of 100 VLCCs. These are all being utilized for the existing import of Chinese crude.

We have not seen Chinese charters active in the market for the last 6 months, you can say. And they take care of China's import from primarily West Africa, but also the other cargoes that come out. And then you have a fleet of about 200 vessels, which is controlled by national oil companies and other kind of major oil companies. And then you have to look at the orange kind of last column here, which is actually the independent traders and of course, Sinokor, which is a fleet that's almost -- is below 400 vessels. This is the fleet that gets affected by the ever-changing trading patterns and arbs opening and shutting.

And this is also why any kind of disturbance to the trade becomes quite violent in the freight rate terms. As far as we can analyze currently, there is about 70 VLCCs involved in the shuttling of crude in and out of the Hormuz Strait. This is a mixture of the column, which we call national oil companies and the pure spot players. But this is almost 10% of the fleet that is below 20 years, not dark and not sanctioned, but looking at the actively traded fleet, it's nearing 20%. We also know that this fleet is constantly being exposed to disturbance by way of being -- by way of attacks.

And there are certain market sources that are putting into the numbers that between 1% and potentially 2% of the VLCC fleet is currently either under repairs or in some cases, becoming a total loss. Then I would like to move to Slide 12 and look at the order books. This is an alarming picture for anybody that's been in shipping for a long period of time. And kind of historically, we would say that the party is over. But there is some granularity here. If you look at the current high order book levels, which is, on average, 27% for the asset classes that we engage. You also have to have a look at the column for 15-plus years.

These are the vessels that will come to age as the order book delivers. And this can, and we hope will cushion the impacts of the very large delivery years we are approaching. To further exemplify this, we have a slide on Page 13, where we're trying to do kind of an indication or show you the net fleet developments as the order books look right now. We'll come up with a new term, and this is the deadbeat fleet. So this is the fleet that under normal circumstances, probably wouldn't be around.

And this is kind of going to form a cushion as we move forward because it's likely to be expected that the debit fleet is going to be starting to move to recycling yards if this market breaks in any kind of severe manner. And if you keep that into consideration, at the same time, we look at kind of how the fleet age as we move forward into 2030. We're actually only -- well, only, we're looking at the peak fleet growth of between 6% and 7% in 2028, the way the order book looks right now.

And this is all due to the simple fact that although we have a very high order book, we also have the highest observed age of the -- average age of the global tanker fleet that we've had for decades. Then I'd like to move on to Slide 14 and a quick summary. And we question, are we currently trading low in the mother of all cycles? I actually did this headline on Monday or Tuesday. And I can say that we're already in a situation where freight rates are actually starting to move north again after having kind of a fall for the last 2, 3 weeks.

But we still have historically high freight rates, and they are, to some extent, also challenging the oil trading complex. This is a development that will ebb and flow because the trade needs to have room for the freight. So it means that the arbs need to widen in order for oil to be transported. We have seen that when we reach the peaks back in October, oil actually stopped moving. With the levels we are now, the oil can start to move again. And I think we'll be in -- will be very high, but will also be ebbing and flowing depending on the supply of oil coming to the market.

As we already mentioned, global crude exports is beyond September '25 heights. And I don't think any of you had that on your bingo card back in May, June. Asia imports ex China is recovering beyond historical and seasonal highs, which is a positive. And the energy security and inventory situation is likely to dominate the narrative. The long-term implications as fleet aging inefficiency and expanding trade patterns will cushion the impact of the order books as far as we see. And Frontline continue to be center stage with our modern VLCC heavy fleet. And we also need to note that the long-term period market implies lasting disruptions and fairly high tanker markets.

And with that, I will open up for questions.

Operator: [Operator Instructions] And the first question comes from Jon Chappell from Evercore ISI.

Jonathan Chappell: Lars, I'm going to start where you finished the long-term period market. I think it's in the press release, you have 17 ships on time charter right now, which is pretty elevated given Frontline's history of being more exposed to the spot market. You've talked about a lot of the uncertainty, a lot of the volatility, that recent pull down the last couple of day tick-up. Is this an opportunity for you to maybe continue to tweak the Frontline operating model and take advantage of the maximum inefficiency and disruption and lock in more cash flow? Or do you think you still want to be kind of full hilt to the spot market?

Lars Barstad: Well, it's a good question. And as you perfectly well know, but for the audience, most of the TCE cover that we have on is fairly short dated so it means that a lot of these time charter contracts were done early in the year. With the lack of a crystal ball, we actually didn't see this happening when these were concluded. So this will come off kind of starting in Q1 and during Q1, which means we have an opportunity to reload kind of time charter cover at higher levels.

When we decide to do that is difficult to say because the challenge in this market is that the near-term, kind of, cash generation you can do on spot means that these time charter curves are steeply backwardated. So it kind of hurts to make those decisions. But I think as a general note, you should expect Frontline to have a much higher degree of time charter coverage as we proceed compared to previous years. So I hope that answers your question.

Jonathan Chappell: It does. And it segues to my follow-up, too. I mean, obviously, it does hurt given the spot market levels right now, but as you kind of insinuated if didn't say directly, there is some fragility to those numbers. I thought this first bullet point on your last slide was really interesting in the commentary around challenging the oil trading complex. Do you think what we saw in October is somewhat of a perceived ceiling on how high rates can go before it starts to change the global trading patterns.

And within the context of possibly a higher floor given the inventory restocking, the continued inefficiencies, geopolitical uncertainty and now maybe potentially a ceiling that we can identify, is it more violent within maybe a tighter incredibly elevated, but still a tighter range? Do you think over the next 12 months?

Lars Barstad: It's very hard to say. This is -- these are not kind of fixed boundaries, right? What we saw and which will propel the rates into the stratosphere was, I think, kind of more desperation than economics, kind of, refiners facing having to shut in refinery runs, which is far more costly than what any freight can be. But then I think also kind of why we dived, kind of, off the peaks was probably due to far more volume oil. The oil market in general became far more or far better supplied as the trade through Hormuz became fairly efficient.

So I think to answer that question, at the end of the day, it's going to be how much oil volume is going to be available to the market as oil products have indicated, kind of, at least for a few weeks now, it's been plenty. But if the export or the challenges to oil exports out of the inner kind of Middle East Gulf persists going forward for weeks, maybe we'll have a situation where the marginal barrel will be much harder to get a hold of. And where both traders and refineries will have to account for the increased freight cost.

So this is a little bit whether if it's the dog or the tail or whatever the expression is. But I think kind of the -- so it's a fact that freight to some extent, stopped the yards. But it's also a fact that, that happened at the same time as far more oil volume than people expected started to flow through, particularly in the Middle East. So it's difficult to say. I think the one to watch, of course, is this volume or the reduction of the volume that we might have observed recently being able to come through the Strait of Hormuz.

Operator: We are now going to take the next question. And this question comes from Greg Lewis from BTIG.

Gregory Lewis: Lars, I'd love to get more thoughts around Slide 11 in those 70 Vs that are kind of in that shuttle trade. Really, what I'm trying to understand is you mentioned some of those are like captive fleets. Did we see vessels maybe that had been used to store oil enter the shuttle trade kind of like as we think about those vessels, what's kind of the utilization because those vessels would be moving through any way kind of like, I guess, maybe like what are the wait times on the other side of the Strait that's kind of hampering or extracting utilization. As we think about those 70 Vs, how inefficient do we think that is to the market?

Lars Barstad: It's a very good question and also very difficult to answer. I would like to answer it may be potentially in a different manner. There are actors in this market that we are also public that we have performed the Hormuz trade and if you look at some of the numbers that they are making public, it's about half of what the TD3C index has implied. So that basically means that, although your headline number is more than $1 million per day, what you can actually churn out of it in TCE terms due to inefficiencies due to the waiting that you just mentioned.

And it's not like you say it's a 10- to 11-day voyage to go dip in and out of the Strait of Hormuz. Obviously, it takes much longer because of changing security situation attacks, you don't want to sail kind of the minute, there is activity. The STS activity takes time as well. And maybe a way to load at the terminals and all that stuff. So it looks like the inefficiency is fairly high in that trade and what you're actually able to capture in money as a shipowner is a little bit less in a TCE equivalent than maybe what the market has anticipated.

As Frontline, we don't participate in that trade, but of course, we note the headline numbers. But I think that maybe answers some of your questions. Secondly, we were just in Dubai a couple of weeks, sorry, a week back, met kind of all our key clients in the region. And we understand that kind of the incidents in the shuttle, kind of, market is kind of quite underreported. So it's been an increasing threat and you have incidents happening 2, 3 times a day. Of course, not necessarily severe, but enough to make meaning that the vessel needs to go -- undergo some sort of repair before it can, kind of, partake in the trade again.

So -- but mind you, the 70 vessels, this is also a floating target. But I think this is probably a good point to mention how kind of U.S. have opened up for that you can get an amnesty or get pulled off the OFAC list if you kind of apply. And in that application process, you actually have to explain what is the purpose or what will be the purpose of the ship. And as far as we understand, the only purpose you can have is to partake in this shuttle trade.

So that 70 number might actually increase as we move forward because that's the only possibility you have to capitalize on vessels that are heavily sanctioned by U.S.

Gregory Lewis: Okay. Super helpful. And then I did have my second question I wanted to ask is around the order book. Obviously, you lay it out in the chart, but it's just -- as you think about digging deeper into those numbers, clearly, everybody sees the 60-ish vessels that are scheduled to deliver next year, then there that massive ramp the following year. I guess my question is kind of around this. I feel like in average years we've seen some shipyards or ships get pushed back into the following year. It seems like there's 5% to 10% slippage in an average year. So -- and I'm curious your thoughts around that.

And then the other question is, I imagine you've done a lot of diligence on a lot of these shipyards and probably visited most of them. What do you think the actual ability is of these yards to go from saying, making 60 ships as an industry to 130, i.e., as challenging as '28 looks, could we see a scenario where maybe '28, '29 and '30 kind of smooth out.

Lars Barstad: Yes. Both 2 good questions. And slippage was kind of a keyword in our presentations kind of pre-2020. And you're right, it was ranging between 5% and 15% actually for any year. And I think it's important for you and the audience to understand that. I don't think we can introduce 60 or 100 VLCCs to the market any year really without actually seeing the markets come under some pressure. The idea here is, are we going into pressure that's going to really put a dent in the market? Or will it just kind of put a slight pressure on rates during kind of the peak delivery period.

As far as we understand, most of the 2027 vessels are actually coming in the second half of the year, which could be a challenge, of course. But it all depends on where we are kind of market-wise at that point in time. What's the situation between U.S. and Iran and what's the, kind of, energy complex in general. But with that, kind of moving over to the yards. What we understand and we've actually seen this, is that some of the most expensive yards, the yards that have added a lot of capacity in the last couple of years are actually starting to struggle with getting skilled workforce.

So it means that the way these yards work is that you have an existing yard, you add the docks and then you can build, kind of, a new series of ships, right? But you need a lot of people to work in that dock. You need a lot of skilled welders and other sorts of quite highly qualified people. And we are at the point now where even in China, they're struggling to get hold of this to the point where certain shipyards are standing outside their competitors, offering people as they leave work, a job with their kind of setup. So this is creating some sort of inflation also in the -- in how you remunerate the workers.

So I think, kind of, even in China, you might be kind of getting close to where -- there is a limit to how much it can grow from here. So that makes us quite comfortable that we're not going to see an aggressive increase in the capacity to build ships. And also, I think it's important to note that -- it still show that other segments, non-tanker segments are also ordering ships at the various yards. So it's -- there is no margin pressure for these guys as of yet.

Operator: We are now going to take the next question. And this one comes from Rohit Sah from Makalu Fund Management.

Rohit Sah: I have 2 questions. First question is about inventory plans. As you know, many countries have announced plans to increase their crude oil inventory over and above what it was last year. So of course, the freight rates play a big role in when those inventories are refilled, right, because they'll have to be exported. So can you give us a sense of where freight rates have to be before countries can start thinking about rebuilding their crude oil inventories.

Lars Barstad: That's a hard one, Rohit. But I thank you for picking up on the points, which is a very good one. when this situation happened in February, there were some big consuming countries, I can name India, I can name Korea, Indonesia, Vietnam that find themselves in a situation where they actually didn't have sufficient -- neither strategic oil nor commercial storage which created an issue for them. And you rightfully say there are plans to expand this -- their capacity to store oil, both commercially and strategically. But I don't necessarily think it's a freight question. I think it's an oil price question.

So at least what we've seen historically is that for China, they seem to be motivated by low oil prices. That's when they go in and replenish their inventories. And freight is not really what's making it, kind of, making them stop to build that way. But again, we also believe that we are not going to have like this October super market for extended period of time. If you really want an answer, right now, we seem to have pretty normalized markets. We see the trade working, but we're still kind of between $200,000 and $300,000 per day on a VLCC. So maybe that's the answer.

Rohit Sah: Okay. My second question is that the Atlantic ocean exports have picked up considerably this year. And structurally, it looks like the Atlantic will become more and more important for crude oil exports. So as this shift moves from the Middle East to the Atlantic slowly over time, how much of an impact do you see this having on the tanker market?

Lars Barstad: I think it's going to be very positive. And if you look at it, and India has already kind of said they will, Korea has already committed to taking more barrels from Atlantic Basin exporters going forward. But the interesting part here is what will then happen to the Middle East barrels because they will have to then find another one. And so I think kind of you can have a very interesting trade developing here where you'll have increased flows from the Atlantic Basin to the Far East. But then you'll have actually also an increased flow from Middle East to the continent. So which is the perfect kind of storm for us as shipowners.

So -- but I think as a general, we will see ton miles gradually increase whenever this comes to fruition.

Rohit Sah: Do you have a -- can you give us a sense of how much impact that would be, let's say, you had to shift 1 million barrels from the Middle East to Asia from -- instead from Atlantic to Asia, how much would that increase in VLCC demand?

Lars Barstad: Well, it's 30% just there on the voyage length.

Operator: We are now going to take the next question. And this one comes from Audrey Zong from China Securities.

Audrey Zong: This is Audrey Zong from China Securities. Actually, I think you have touched a little bit about this question. I want to know, looking at 2027, there are 3 key variables: growing cargo volumes, shorter average voyage distances as Middle Eastern barrels replaced Atlantic supplies and additional vessel days absorbed by shuttle operations and STS transfers. How do you assess their net impact on vessel demand with newbuilding deliveries, adding supply under what conditions do you -- will you expect average VLCC Spot TCEs in 2027 to exceed the already strong levels of 2026.

Lars Barstad: Well, thank you, Audrey. If I had the answer to that, like an exact one, I will probably not work here. But this is like an equation with many unknowns, right? And I think if you assume that we're going to be continuing like we are doing now with kind of time-consuming trade out of the -- or day consuming trade out of the Middle East, the Atlantic basin doing what it does right now, and you add a lot of modern efficient ships to the market. We are certainly not going to have the market that we observed in October because there is more capacity coming to this market.

And I don't think -- it's not like the Middle East are going to surpass their volumes materially from what they did earlier in October. So maybe that answers a little bit of your question. But then again, I think the situation is going to be very fluid, and it's going to be fluid going forward. So I would like to kind of maybe answer it differently. There are extremely smart charterers they're willing to pay $100,000 per day for a 3-year time charter for a VLCC so -- and the backwardation in the curve tells us that this is the market we have now and the market we had a month ago, it's not going to last forever, right?

But the floor is going to be far higher than what we have observed in previous cycles. I think that's how I would answer it.

Operator: [Operator Instructions] There seems to be no further questions for today. I will now hand the call back to Lars Barstad for closing remarks.

Lars Barstad: Thank you very much, and thank you for listening in. Very interesting times, exhausting times to some degree. Let's hope for some sort of solution in the Middle East situation. And let's see how this plays out. Thank you.

Operator: This concludes today's conference call. Thank you for participating. You may now disconnect.

Should you buy stock in Frontline Plc right now?

Before you buy stock in Frontline Plc, consider this:

The Motley Fool Stock Advisor analyst team just identified what they believe are the 10 best stocks for investors to buy now… and Frontline Plc wasn’t one of them. The 10 stocks that made the cut could produce monster returns in the coming years.

Consider when Netflix made this list on December 17, 2004... if you invested $1,000 at the time of our recommendation, you’d have $315,271!* Or when Nvidia made this list on April 15, 2005... if you invested $1,000 at the time of our recommendation, you’d have $896,981!*

Now, it’s worth noting Stock Advisor’s total average return is 768% — a market-crushing outperformance compared to 198% for the S&P 500. Don't miss the latest top 10 list, available with Stock Advisor, and join an investing community built by individual investors for individual investors.

See the 10 stocks »

*Stock Advisor returns as of November 20, 2026.

This article is a transcript of this conference call produced for The Motley Fool. While we strive for our Foolish Best, there may be errors, omissions, or inaccuracies in this transcript. Parts of this article were created using Large Language Models (LLMs) based on The Motley Fool's insights and investing approach. It has been reviewed by our AI quality control systems. Since LLMs cannot (currently) own stocks, it has no positions in any of the stocks mentioned. As with all our articles, The Motley Fool does not assume any responsibility for your use of this content, and we strongly encourage you to do your own research, including listening to the call yourself and reading the company's SEC filings. Please see our Terms and Conditions for additional details, including our Obligatory Capitalized Disclaimers of Liability.

The Motley Fool has no position in any of the stocks mentioned. The Motley Fool has a disclosure policy.

Disclaimer: For information purposes only. Past performance is not indicative of future results.
placeholder
Gold Price Today: Can XAU/USD Hold $3,500? | Mitrade AUGold approaches US$3,500 as Fed tightening fears drive sharp weekly losses. Explore XAU/USD levels, Treasury yields and the outlook for Australian traders.
Author  Mitrade Team
12 hours ago
Gold approaches US$3,500 as Fed tightening fears drive sharp weekly losses. Explore XAU/USD levels, Treasury yields and the outlook for Australian traders.
placeholder
Australia’s jobs market just cracked — has the AUD/USD rate story flipped?Australia’s weakening jobs market is raising fresh questions about the RBA’s interest rate outlook and the Australian dollar. Explore why AUD/USD could be losing support, the key factors driving currency movements and what Australian forex traders should watch next.
Author  Mark Garro
17 hours ago
Australia’s weakening jobs market is raising fresh questions about the RBA’s interest rate outlook and the Australian dollar. Explore why AUD/USD could be losing support, the key factors driving currency movements and what Australian forex traders should watch next.
placeholder
Market News Today Australia: VIX Surges Nearly 16%, Gold Breaks US$3,600 and US Stocks SlideVIX jumps 15.8%, Nasdaq 100 falls 2.21% and gold slips below US$3,600. Explore Anthropic’s debut and the outlook for Australian CFD traders.
Author  Mitrade Team
18 hours ago
VIX jumps 15.8%, Nasdaq 100 falls 2.21% and gold slips below US$3,600. Explore Anthropic’s debut and the outlook for Australian CFD traders.
placeholder
Is Tech in a Bear Market? 20 Tech Stocks Fall Up to 76% From HighsAll 20 tech stocks on a list from financial newsletter The Kobeissi Letter trade at least 25% below record highs. CoreWeave (CRWV) leads the slide at 76%.Additionally, the S&P 500 has lost over $6 tri
Author  Beincrypto
19 hours ago
All 20 tech stocks on a list from financial newsletter The Kobeissi Letter trade at least 25% below record highs. CoreWeave (CRWV) leads the slide at 76%.Additionally, the S&P 500 has lost over $6 tri
placeholder
Gold and Bitcoin Are Falling. Peter Schiff Sees Opportunities for BothPeter Schiff says gold should not have fallen at all, while Bitcoin (BTC) has not fallen enough. The gold advocate calls the metal’s drop a buying opportunity and Bitcoin’s a selling opportunity.Both
Author  Beincrypto
19 hours ago
Peter Schiff says gold should not have fallen at all, while Bitcoin (BTC) has not fallen enough. The gold advocate calls the metal’s drop a buying opportunity and Bitcoin’s a selling opportunity.Both
goTop
quote